Kofman: Let me give some answers based on numbers. Russia deferred a lot of its casualties onto convicts, particularly some of the bloodier battles in 2023. Assault groups comprised of Storm-Z convict units are a notable percentage. These people volunteered from the prisons. Second, from the original invasion, a lot of the initial losses were comprised of LDNR, the occupied regions in Ukraine, the Luhank People’s Republic. These are people who also took significant casualties, particularly in the first year of the war. In the last year and half, the casualties have grown among contract Russians. But if you look at overall pool of casualties, you’ll see a couple of categories. First, politically-relevant casualties among the initial invasion force. Young soldiers and officers killed early on in the war. Then you quickly begin to see these casualties offset by those in LDNR and then convicts. Then you see the politically-sensitive casualties following the partial mobilization where they got about 300k men, quickly replaced by contract personnel and convict used in 2023 through 2024. Those are individuals who signed up to fight for money. From open-source information, we know that a lot of families encouraged them to fight and even sign up for assault groups where they had the risk of being killed, but the payout is even much higher on top of the bonuses. This kind of casualty composition…as Andrea says, not politically-significant groups and not seen as politically-significant. Not generating pressure from Russian society to end the war. Average age group of Russian casualties, as far as we can tell, is around 35-36. Not a young person’s war. On the Ukrainian side, it’s higher. It’s in the 40s. If it were 18-year-olds and 19-year-olds, you’d probably see more mothers out on the streets. But when average age is mid- to late-30s, then it’s a bit of a different story. Second part, this is gonna be a bit cold-blooded of me to say, but on the one hand, these casualties are greater than all wars combined that Russia has taken in all wars since World War II. On the other hand, these casualties are basically one large battle in World War I or World War II. For a country with a population of 145 million people, starting about 137 million people, these casualties are significant but not as great as they sound. What’s notable is that this is a war between two post-modern societies. Can’t extrapolate directly from casualties in WW2, because nature of societies was different back then. Much more casualty-tolerant. Birth rates were much higher – you could lose a lot more people, and the average agrarian household had 6, 7 kids. This also gets into the manpower/motivation issue. You’re dealing with two countries with bad demographic structures. Russia’s is bad, and Ukraine’s is worse. Neither country has the family structure to replace the losses, particularly among young people, that countries would have in the mid-20th century. Important to keep this in mind as well. Casualties are significant, not as much among young people. Notable because taking place in two post-modern societies that don’t have a high birthrate, and terrible demographics, but also not that great when the overall population size and duration of the war. Potentially one campaign in World War 1 would have produced this casualty set. So just giving you a way to think about it.
Kofinas: No, that’s great. I’m not as immersed in foreign policy and international relations as you two, but I haven’t heard this debated anywhere. So that’s useful. Let’s zoom out and talk about question of why these talks are being held in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world. Maybe also a critical player in the Middle East, important for Israel-Gaza, factor in Iran, good relations with US and China.
Kendall-Taylor: Historically you would pick a neutral city in Europe.
Kofinas: Budapest, right wing vibe?
Kendall-Taylor: Helsinki and Stockholm are in NATO now. Number of cities where the US and Russia have historically met…that set is shrinking. Budapest? Orbán has not played any meaningful role in any of this conflict. Early on, Turkey has played an important role. Don’t know why they didn’t end up back in Istanbul. Don’t know for sure. Putin and Trump have historically had good relations with the Saudis. Main criteria would be that it needs to be somewhere neutral. Rather short list of countries that meet that criteria.
Kofman: Makes sense. Intersection of Venn diagram of countries that US and Russia have friendly relations, seen as neutral, and countries willing to do it. Not much in that intersection.
Kofinas: Gets back to question of whether there is a strategy. Easy to be critical of Trump, I have, and the way he…gesticulates. But devil’s advocate, is it possible that he’s working on some larger strategic deal? Is there any daylight? Let’s examine it from the Russian perspective. Not ideal situation, dependent on relationship with China? Is there any opportunity to cleave Russia from China? Any possibility to bring them back into the Western fold anytime soon? At least decrease dependency on China in some way to advance US strategic aims in Pacific?
Kendall-Taylor: Question that is debated over and over again. I am highly skeptical that the reason for this outreach has anything to do with trying to peel the Russians away from the Chinese. I’ve heard Trump talk about the Nobel Peace Prize. Think that Trump just has affinity for strongmen and that Putin has been at the top of the buddy wishlist for a very long time. I think he is jealous of power that Putin wields in Russian political system and aspires to something similar for himself. I can’t play devil’s advocate on this one – I think that it is so egregious how he has shifted US policy towards Russia on a dime here. Just yesterday, the Security Council meeting, had statement to condemn Russia’s invasion and call for its withdrawal. What did US do? Voted against the resolution, with Russia and group of pariahs. North Korea, Syria, Central Africa Republica, Eritrea. How far the US has come, how detrimental to standing and influence in rest of the world. In terms of “is there a larger deal at play”…if there is one, I’d go back to previous point about spheres of influence, think Trump wants strong can do as they want, if Canada can be a 51st state, great, if we can have access to Greenland, why not? If we are the most-powerful state, we should be able to do what we want. If it’s the Gulf of Mexico, nope, it’s the Gulf of America. I think that’s his vision of the world, that the strong should do as they please, and so by that logic, I think he looks at Putin’s invasion of Ukraine as fitting as the way that he views the world. Highly skeptical that there is any grand plan to peel Russia away…people are debating it, but I am highly skeptical.
Kofinas: Playing the devil’s advocate: as much as Trump may have an affinity for strongmen, he also wants to be the strongest. He wants to be the winner. Curious decision to vote against the resolution to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It perhaps makes more sense if that’s a public signalling, but in private conversation other conversations happening. You don’t think that’s possible?
Kendall-Taylor: Explanation from Rubio was that we don’t want to antagonize the Russians. Come on.
Kofinas: I mean that’s the public…yeah.
Kendall-Taylor: I don’t know how to look at that in any other way than to say that Trump wants a deal so badly, the desperation and the desire to get along with the Russians that there’s a desire to work out a deal at any cost. It just selling out to the Russians. The thing that is so…I don’t understand the change in position. We used to talk about peace through strength, and that seems to be out the window, and instead it’s concession after concession. This disgraceful voting at the UN Security Council. I don’t understand the logic. I don’t understand how they think that they are going to strike any durable peace with the Russians when we are basically kowtowing major issues before we even enter into negotiations…if we enter into any major deal in which Russia has pocketed so many concessions…to get back to the Foreign Affairs piece, the point that Mike and I make is that Russia will pocket those concessions and strengthen for future aggression against Ukraine and the wider West.
Kofinas: It is curious, curious that Trump attacked Zelenskyy ahead of talks. Had some idea, though Mike threw cold water on it, would be that Trump might be trying to create space to maneuver politically for Putin if more hawkish factions on the right were applying pressure…
Kendall-Taylor: I think that you’re ascribing way too much strategy and intent. Really, what I think, and I’ve heard this from major US figures, is that he didn’t like the way that Zelenskyy corrected him and has taken a harder stance. I mean, I think that it’s that petty and personal. I think that he felt the need to be the strong, decisive leader, and try to put Zelenskyy back in his box. I don’t think that there was any grand play than that he didn’t like it or want to be talked to that way and so he went on the attack, and then has to double down. Hard to change course as a strong, decisive leader if he goes down that path.
Kofman: So far, I do not think that Trump’s approach is geostrategic, not really thinking in that way. Much more transactional and economically-oriented. I think that the Russians have seized on this, and so they are proposing economic deals, resource trades. A lot of these are very unrealistic, as companies are not going to rush to return to Russia.
Kendall-Taylor: Remind listeners too who was president in Riyadh. It was the head of the Russian Direct Investment Bank, which is a clear signal of the way that the Russians are approaching the administration.
Kofman: Yeah, they’re pitching them business deals. They’re trying to, in their mind, outbid Ukraine. Offering greater opportunities. And they’re trying to position sanctions against Russia as a big opportunity cost for us, which it isn’t. Even before those sanctions…if I were to show you the net volume of trade between US and Russia, it was tiny. Even though it had some critical material categories in there, like titanium and whatnot, things that are important to certain industries. But nonetheless, it was incredibly small. It was Europe that the principal balance of trade with Russia, not us. There isn’t a rush to the door of companies trying to get back into Russia – I’m sorry, you’re not going to see this. To me, Trump’s approach is much more looking for wins right now, and things that can be declared as wins rather than big-picture strategy. I also think that your question about Russia and China…isn’t really the way they’re thinking about it and wouldn’t work anyway. I don’t think that they’re trying to pull Russia away from China, and I’ve been very public in the past that I don’t think that that would work; I think that this is a magical misreading of Cold War history and I’m happy to get into why, but it’s…the sort of thing that briefs well and policy wonks can talk about but doesn’t work in practice. I don’t think that they’re trying to do that, though. From what I’ve seen, Trump does have some guiding views and preferences. If I may summarize them, and I’m no expert on the Trump administration, but it’s great-power politics over alliance bloc politics. It’s trying to end wars that he thinks are bad for everyone economically. Even if he doesn’t have the correct perception of who started the war, why the war took place, or what the consequences are of ending it, he’s prioritizing ending it in some shape or form. It’s pursuing naked-self interest over allies or traditional values. Kind of the old Lord Palmerston quote of “there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests”. A lot of conversations I have about the Trump administration seem to be people observing that someone has put a hole in the wall and trying to draw a target around it after the fact. It’s like post-hoc rationalizing of what’s taken place. I’m wary of that approach.
Last point. On my last comment about casualties, keep in mind that this is just a dart thrown at a wall by me, not statistics that you should take to the bank. Please don’t take that as “Mike Kofman gave a hard estimate” – there’s a pretty big cone of uncertainty on that.
Kofinas: Thanks for that. Next hour, want to talk about nuclear doctrine. Are we looking at a new approach to foreign policy that will transcend administrations, and what sort of world order will that create? Like, more realpolitik. Also want to talk about future of security in Europe. One thing that we can all agree on right now is that Europe has a lot of problems. [Kofinas then promotes a premium subscription for additional content.]
[continued from parent]
Kofman: Let me give some answers based on numbers. Russia deferred a lot of its casualties onto convicts, particularly some of the bloodier battles in 2023. Assault groups comprised of Storm-Z convict units are a notable percentage. These people volunteered from the prisons. Second, from the original invasion, a lot of the initial losses were comprised of LDNR, the occupied regions in Ukraine, the Luhank People’s Republic. These are people who also took significant casualties, particularly in the first year of the war. In the last year and half, the casualties have grown among contract Russians. But if you look at overall pool of casualties, you’ll see a couple of categories. First, politically-relevant casualties among the initial invasion force. Young soldiers and officers killed early on in the war. Then you quickly begin to see these casualties offset by those in LDNR and then convicts. Then you see the politically-sensitive casualties following the partial mobilization where they got about 300k men, quickly replaced by contract personnel and convict used in 2023 through 2024. Those are individuals who signed up to fight for money. From open-source information, we know that a lot of families encouraged them to fight and even sign up for assault groups where they had the risk of being killed, but the payout is even much higher on top of the bonuses. This kind of casualty composition…as Andrea says, not politically-significant groups and not seen as politically-significant. Not generating pressure from Russian society to end the war. Average age group of Russian casualties, as far as we can tell, is around 35-36. Not a young person’s war. On the Ukrainian side, it’s higher. It’s in the 40s. If it were 18-year-olds and 19-year-olds, you’d probably see more mothers out on the streets. But when average age is mid- to late-30s, then it’s a bit of a different story. Second part, this is gonna be a bit cold-blooded of me to say, but on the one hand, these casualties are greater than all wars combined that Russia has taken in all wars since World War II. On the other hand, these casualties are basically one large battle in World War I or World War II. For a country with a population of 145 million people, starting about 137 million people, these casualties are significant but not as great as they sound. What’s notable is that this is a war between two post-modern societies. Can’t extrapolate directly from casualties in WW2, because nature of societies was different back then. Much more casualty-tolerant. Birth rates were much higher – you could lose a lot more people, and the average agrarian household had 6, 7 kids. This also gets into the manpower/motivation issue. You’re dealing with two countries with bad demographic structures. Russia’s is bad, and Ukraine’s is worse. Neither country has the family structure to replace the losses, particularly among young people, that countries would have in the mid-20th century. Important to keep this in mind as well. Casualties are significant, not as much among young people. Notable because taking place in two post-modern societies that don’t have a high birthrate, and terrible demographics, but also not that great when the overall population size and duration of the war. Potentially one campaign in World War 1 would have produced this casualty set. So just giving you a way to think about it.
Kofinas: No, that’s great. I’m not as immersed in foreign policy and international relations as you two, but I haven’t heard this debated anywhere. So that’s useful. Let’s zoom out and talk about question of why these talks are being held in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world. Maybe also a critical player in the Middle East, important for Israel-Gaza, factor in Iran, good relations with US and China.
Kendall-Taylor: Historically you would pick a neutral city in Europe.
Kofinas: Budapest, right wing vibe?
Kendall-Taylor: Helsinki and Stockholm are in NATO now. Number of cities where the US and Russia have historically met…that set is shrinking. Budapest? Orbán has not played any meaningful role in any of this conflict. Early on, Turkey has played an important role. Don’t know why they didn’t end up back in Istanbul. Don’t know for sure. Putin and Trump have historically had good relations with the Saudis. Main criteria would be that it needs to be somewhere neutral. Rather short list of countries that meet that criteria.
Kofman: Makes sense. Intersection of Venn diagram of countries that US and Russia have friendly relations, seen as neutral, and countries willing to do it. Not much in that intersection.
Kofinas: Gets back to question of whether there is a strategy. Easy to be critical of Trump, I have, and the way he…gesticulates. But devil’s advocate, is it possible that he’s working on some larger strategic deal? Is there any daylight? Let’s examine it from the Russian perspective. Not ideal situation, dependent on relationship with China? Is there any opportunity to cleave Russia from China? Any possibility to bring them back into the Western fold anytime soon? At least decrease dependency on China in some way to advance US strategic aims in Pacific?
Kendall-Taylor: Question that is debated over and over again. I am highly skeptical that the reason for this outreach has anything to do with trying to peel the Russians away from the Chinese. I’ve heard Trump talk about the Nobel Peace Prize. Think that Trump just has affinity for strongmen and that Putin has been at the top of the buddy wishlist for a very long time. I think he is jealous of power that Putin wields in Russian political system and aspires to something similar for himself. I can’t play devil’s advocate on this one – I think that it is so egregious how he has shifted US policy towards Russia on a dime here. Just yesterday, the Security Council meeting, had statement to condemn Russia’s invasion and call for its withdrawal. What did US do? Voted against the resolution, with Russia and group of pariahs. North Korea, Syria, Central Africa Republica, Eritrea. How far the US has come, how detrimental to standing and influence in rest of the world. In terms of “is there a larger deal at play”…if there is one, I’d go back to previous point about spheres of influence, think Trump wants strong can do as they want, if Canada can be a 51st state, great, if we can have access to Greenland, why not? If we are the most-powerful state, we should be able to do what we want. If it’s the Gulf of Mexico, nope, it’s the Gulf of America. I think that’s his vision of the world, that the strong should do as they please, and so by that logic, I think he looks at Putin’s invasion of Ukraine as fitting as the way that he views the world. Highly skeptical that there is any grand plan to peel Russia away…people are debating it, but I am highly skeptical.
Kofinas: Playing the devil’s advocate: as much as Trump may have an affinity for strongmen, he also wants to be the strongest. He wants to be the winner. Curious decision to vote against the resolution to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It perhaps makes more sense if that’s a public signalling, but in private conversation other conversations happening. You don’t think that’s possible?
Kendall-Taylor: Explanation from Rubio was that we don’t want to antagonize the Russians. Come on.
Kofinas: I mean that’s the public…yeah.
Kendall-Taylor: I don’t know how to look at that in any other way than to say that Trump wants a deal so badly, the desperation and the desire to get along with the Russians that there’s a desire to work out a deal at any cost. It just selling out to the Russians. The thing that is so…I don’t understand the change in position. We used to talk about peace through strength, and that seems to be out the window, and instead it’s concession after concession. This disgraceful voting at the UN Security Council. I don’t understand the logic. I don’t understand how they think that they are going to strike any durable peace with the Russians when we are basically kowtowing major issues before we even enter into negotiations…if we enter into any major deal in which Russia has pocketed so many concessions…to get back to the Foreign Affairs piece, the point that Mike and I make is that Russia will pocket those concessions and strengthen for future aggression against Ukraine and the wider West.
Kofinas: It is curious, curious that Trump attacked Zelenskyy ahead of talks. Had some idea, though Mike threw cold water on it, would be that Trump might be trying to create space to maneuver politically for Putin if more hawkish factions on the right were applying pressure…
Kendall-Taylor: I think that you’re ascribing way too much strategy and intent. Really, what I think, and I’ve heard this from major US figures, is that he didn’t like the way that Zelenskyy corrected him and has taken a harder stance. I mean, I think that it’s that petty and personal. I think that he felt the need to be the strong, decisive leader, and try to put Zelenskyy back in his box. I don’t think that there was any grand play than that he didn’t like it or want to be talked to that way and so he went on the attack, and then has to double down. Hard to change course as a strong, decisive leader if he goes down that path.
Kofman: So far, I do not think that Trump’s approach is geostrategic, not really thinking in that way. Much more transactional and economically-oriented. I think that the Russians have seized on this, and so they are proposing economic deals, resource trades. A lot of these are very unrealistic, as companies are not going to rush to return to Russia.
[continued in child]
[continued from parent]
Kendall-Taylor: Remind listeners too who was president in Riyadh. It was the head of the Russian Direct Investment Bank, which is a clear signal of the way that the Russians are approaching the administration.
Kofman: Yeah, they’re pitching them business deals. They’re trying to, in their mind, outbid Ukraine. Offering greater opportunities. And they’re trying to position sanctions against Russia as a big opportunity cost for us, which it isn’t. Even before those sanctions…if I were to show you the net volume of trade between US and Russia, it was tiny. Even though it had some critical material categories in there, like titanium and whatnot, things that are important to certain industries. But nonetheless, it was incredibly small. It was Europe that the principal balance of trade with Russia, not us. There isn’t a rush to the door of companies trying to get back into Russia – I’m sorry, you’re not going to see this. To me, Trump’s approach is much more looking for wins right now, and things that can be declared as wins rather than big-picture strategy. I also think that your question about Russia and China…isn’t really the way they’re thinking about it and wouldn’t work anyway. I don’t think that they’re trying to pull Russia away from China, and I’ve been very public in the past that I don’t think that that would work; I think that this is a magical misreading of Cold War history and I’m happy to get into why, but it’s…the sort of thing that briefs well and policy wonks can talk about but doesn’t work in practice. I don’t think that they’re trying to do that, though. From what I’ve seen, Trump does have some guiding views and preferences. If I may summarize them, and I’m no expert on the Trump administration, but it’s great-power politics over alliance bloc politics. It’s trying to end wars that he thinks are bad for everyone economically. Even if he doesn’t have the correct perception of who started the war, why the war took place, or what the consequences are of ending it, he’s prioritizing ending it in some shape or form. It’s pursuing naked-self interest over allies or traditional values. Kind of the old Lord Palmerston quote of “there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests”. A lot of conversations I have about the Trump administration seem to be people observing that someone has put a hole in the wall and trying to draw a target around it after the fact. It’s like post-hoc rationalizing of what’s taken place. I’m wary of that approach.
Last point. On my last comment about casualties, keep in mind that this is just a dart thrown at a wall by me, not statistics that you should take to the bank. Please don’t take that as “Mike Kofman gave a hard estimate” – there’s a pretty big cone of uncertainty on that.
Kofinas: Thanks for that. Next hour, want to talk about nuclear doctrine. Are we looking at a new approach to foreign policy that will transcend administrations, and what sort of world order will that create? Like, more realpolitik. Also want to talk about future of security in Europe. One thing that we can all agree on right now is that Europe has a lot of problems. [Kofinas then promotes a premium subscription for additional content.]